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Policy analysis in applied fields such as agricultural, trade, environmental and development policy is still 
often undertaken within a first-best, rather than a more realistic second-best framework. The present 
paper seeks to contribute to changing this state of affairs by providing an intuitive explanation of what 
determines the optimal tax system. It derives and interprets an optimal tax formula for an economy with 
many goods to explain the optimal tax system as reflecting a trade-off between, on the one hand, the 
objective of encouraging the supply of labour to the market and, on the other hand, the objective of 
limiting the distortion of the marginal rate of substitution between produced goods. It illustrates this 
insight  by  a  quantitative  general  equilibrium  model  which  does  not  impose  separability  between 
consumption and leisure. The analysis clarifies issues of normalisation and deepens the insight due to 
Corlett and Hague (1953) that goods should be taxed according to their complementarity with leisure. 
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The theory of optimal commodity taxation addresses the question of what characterizes 
the solution to  the government’s problem of raising a given amount of  revenue by 
commodity  taxes  when  the  instrument  of  differential  lump-sum  taxation  is  not 
available. Aside from the obvious relevance for tax policy, the theory has important 
implications  for  labour  market,  environmental,  transport,  educational,  pension, 
agricultural,  trade  and  development  policies,  and  for  a  range  of  other  policy  areas 
involving government decisions on pricing and taxes. 
The development of the modern theory of optimal commodity taxation was launched at 
the beginning of the 1970s by a number of articles on optimal taxation and public sector 
pricing by prominent theoretical economists
1 who after the end of the decade moved on 
to other fields leaving behind contributions where the insight into what determines the 
optimal tax system was somewhat obscured, in part due to ambiguous justifications of 
rules of normalisation. No intuitive appealing interpretation of what characterises the 
optimal tax system  has subsequently emerged. A leading  expert in  the  field in fact 
considers the theory of optimal taxation as “quite impenetrable from an intuitive point 
of view” and that it for that reason has had a rather limited political impact (Boadway 
1997).  
Policy analysis in applied fields is still often conducted within a first-best framework, 
assuming  (explicitly  or  implicitly)  that  government  expenditures  and  income 
redistribution can be financed by lump-sum taxation. As this assumption is blatantly 
unrealistic, it potentially compromises the policy relevance of such analyses. This is in 
particularly  true  in  the  context  of  trade  policy  and  climate  change  policies.  It  has 
increasingly been realised that the international community and national governments, 
particularly  in  developing  countries,  face  important  challenges  in  terms  of  tax 
collection,  income  redistribution  and  provision  of  public  goods  which  can  only  be 
understood appropriately within a second-best framework. It is therefore unfortunate 
that optimal tax theory, which provides a much more relevant framework for addressing 
these issues than the Second Theorem of Welfare Economics,
2 has had such a limited 
impact. 
On  this  background  we  set  out,  on  the  one  hand,  through  a  non-technical  analysis 
supported by a quantitative example, and, on the other hand, by the derivation of an 
optimal tax formula, to provide an intuitive insight into what determines the optimal tax 
system. In order to focus on this objective, we employ a standard optimal tax model 
with only one representative household. For the sake of exposition we thus deliberately 
                                                       
1 Including Dixit (1970), Baumol and Bradford (1970), Diamond and Mirrlees (1971), Dasgupta and 
Stiglitz (1971), Stiglitz and Dasgupta (1972). 
2 Atkinson and Stiglitz in their 1980 textbook, which consolidated the first 10 years of contributions to 
the  modern  theory  of  optimal  taxation,  and  which  remains  the  most  authoritative  reference  to  this 
literature, write on p357 as a comment to the relevance of policy analysis based on the Second Theorem 
of Welfare, “The basic difficulty is again that the information on which we would like to base differential 
lump-sum taxes is not observable, or is observable only at great cost, and individuals have an incentive 
not to reveal it. For these reasons, lump-sum taxes and transfers are widely assumed not to be available” 3 
 
have left out considerations of equity, external effects, international trade, intertemporal 
allocation of resources, production inefficiency and administrative costs, which it would 
be important to take into account in any application of optimal tax theory in practice. 
 
The article is organised as follows: In Section 2, we identify unsolved theoretical issues 
which we address in the paper. In Section 3, we specify the general equilibrium tax 
model  on  which  the  analysis  is  based,  and  derive  the  standard  results  of  optimal 
commodity  taxation  as the  basis for  the  further  analysis.  In  Section  4,  we  provide, 
supported by a quantitative example, intuitive insight into what determines the optimal 
tax system. In Section 5, starting from the standard conditions for optimality, we derive 
and  interpret  an  optimal  tax  formula  in  terms  of  Antonelli  elasticities  of 
complementarity.  In Section 6 we discuss the implication of the insight provided by the 
analysis for policy  analysis. A final section  summarises  and suggests directions for 
future research. 
 
2. Unresolved issues  
During  the  development  of  the  theory  of  optimal  taxation  in  the  1970s,  the 
government’s problem was at first formulated in terms of maximization of an indirect 
utility function subject to the government’s budget constraint (see e.g. Myles 1995). 
Theoretical  results  were  subsequently  derived  from  alternative  formulations  of  the 
government’s problem using the direct utility function (Atkinson and Stiglitz 1980), the 
expenditure function (Diamond and McFadden 1974 and Dixit 1975) and the distance 
function (Deaton 1979, 1981)
3.  Although less convenient for deriving and interpreting 
analytical results than the expenditure function approach, the indirect utility function 
approach has remained standard in the optimal tax literature
4. 
Interpretation of formal results has been provided in terms of the Ramsey rule (Ramsey 
1927, Diamond and Mirrlees 1976) (see below), but by Mirrlees and others emphasized 
the  importance  of  addressing  optimal  tax  problems  within  a  general  equilibrium 
framework not in terms of optimal tax formulae.  The inverse elasticity rule, known 
form  partial equilibrium analysis and interpreted  as reflecting the Ramsey rule,  has  
been  derived  within  the  general  equilibrium  framework,  but  only  by  imposing 
extremely restrictive assumptions (see e.g. Atkinson and Stiglitz 1980), and has thus 
been of little assistance for the understanding of what determines the optimal tax system 
in general. 
However, many contributions, ostensibly within the Diamond and Mirrlees framework, 
did not spell out the general equilibrium assumptions for the analysis, thus obscuring 
                                                       
3 The link between Indirect utility function approach and the Expenditure function approach is well 
understood, but the link to the Distance function approach seems not to be. 
4 This is in fact surprising. The theory of optimal taxation is closely related to trade theory where for this 
reason general equilibrium conditions for decades have be formulated using the expenditure function 
approach. 4 
 
the theoretical foundation for the analysis and the rationale for the normalisation rules 
adopted. 
The question of when a proportional tax system is optimal initially received different 
answers, partly due to lack of clarity with respect to the justification of the rules of 
normalization adopted. However, it was soon realised, that a proportional tax system, 
based on all commodities, including the supply of labour to the market, will raise no 
revenue and therefore is not feasible and that there is no theoretical justification for why 
the  optimal  tax  system  based  on  produced  commodities  should  be  expected  to  be 
proportional. Nevertheless, partly because the use in applied works of functional forms, 
such as the CES, which impose separability between consumption and leisure, it has 
become the received wisdom that the optimal tax system should be expected to be close 
to  proportional.  It therefore  remains  an  open  question if,  particularly  in  developing 
countries with large informal sectors, this view is justified. 
Dating back to the original contributions to the optimal tax literature there have been 
ambiguities with respect to the interpretation of rules of normalisation. Furthermore, 
theoreticians  working  within  the  Mirrlees’  tradition  have  been  reluctant  to  consider 
optimal tax rules as they were seen to depend on arbitrary rules of normalisation. As a 
consequence what determines the optimal commodity tax system is less well understood 
than could be the case. The  textbook optimal tax formula for an economy with only 
two produced commodities has been interpreted in support of the Corlett and Hague 
(1953) insight that those commodities most complementary with leisure should be taxed 
at the highest rates, e.g. by Layard and Walters (1978). However, the tax formula has 
also been interpreted in terms of the complementarity with the untaxed numeraire rather 
than with leisure (see e.g. Dixit 1975), an interpretation also emphasised in a relatively 
recent,  widely  used  textbook
5.  Whether  the  Corlett  and  Hague  insight  can  be 
generalized to an economy with many commodities, and the importance, if any, of the 
complementarity with leisure for the optimal tax system therefore remained unclear.  
 
                                                       
5 Myles (1995, p124) writes  “It has  been  shown that in  an economy  with constant  returns to scale 
consumer and producer prices can be normalised separately and that standard procedure is to make one 
good the numeraire and set the consumer and producer prices equal. This normalisation also has the 
effect of setting the tax on that good to zero. In particular, the zero tax is just a result of the normalisation 
rule. In particular, the zero tax carries no implication about the nature of the good nor about the ability 
to tax that good. This follows since the good with zero tax can be chosen arbitrarily from the set of 
available goods. Unfortunately, this reasoning has not been as clearly appreciated in some literature, it 
has been inferred from this that, since leisure cannot be measures in the same way as purchase of other 
commodities can, the zero tax on leisure is a restriction on the permissible tax system brought about by 
an inability to tax leisure. In addition the further inference is usually made that the optimal tax system 
aims to overcome this missing tax on the leisure by taxing goods complementary to leisure. Particular 
examples of this is found in the Corlett and Hague (1953) by ‘taxing those goods complementary with 
leisure, one is to some extent taxing leisure itself’ (p. 26) and Layard and Walters (1978) ‘the theory of 
second  best  tells  us  that  if  we  cannot  tax  leisure  we  can  do  better  than  by  taxing  all  goods 
equiproportionally’ (p. 184). Many other instances of similar statements could easily be given. This of 
course is a false interpretation. When real restrictions upon the permissible range of tax instruments are 
introduced the result obtained are affected. A number of such restrictions are considered in Munk (1980) 
where it is shown that the resulting optimal tax structure is sensitive to the precise restrictions imposed”. 5 
 
3. The standard general equilibrium tax model 
In  this  section  we  spell  out  in  some  detail  the  general  equilibrium  foundation  for 
optimal  tax  analysis.  This  is  important  in  order  to  deal  correctly  with  the  issue  of 
normalisation and also in order to establish the links between different approaches to 
optimal tax analysis. 
We consider a competitive economy with one household and a government where N 
commodities are produced by one primary factor. The primary factor is labelled 0, and 
the N produced commodities are labelled 1,..,N. We denote the set of commodities FC 
and  the  set  of  produced  commodities  C.  The  household’s  vector  of  endowments  is 
( ) 0,0,..,0 w º ω and its vector of consumption  ( ) 0 1 , ., N c c , c º c . The vector of market 
transactions by the household is thus  ( ) 0 1 N , ., x x , x º º - x c ω . The primary factor can 
be  thought  of  as  “time”,  making  0 x   the  supply  of  labour  to  the  market  measured 
negatively, and  0 c  consumption of time for household production and relaxation, which 
we referred to as leisure following the convention in the literature
6. Consumer prices are 
( ) 0 1 , ., N q q , q º q  and producer prices are  ( ) 0 1 N , ., p p , p º p . The government's resource 
requirements  is 
G º x ( )
G G G
0 1 N , ., x x , x   and  its  expenditures  thus  '
G Gºp x .  The 
household's  preferences  are  represented  by  a  strictly  quasi-concave  utility  function 
( ) u x . Production possibilities are represented by constant returns to scale production 
functions with  i y  being the output of commodity i and with  0
i y  being the amount of 
the primary factor used in its production. The government's expenditures are financed 
solely by commodity taxes,  º - t q p.  
For such a tax system to be feasible, the three basic conditions for a market equilibrium, 
Profit maximisation, Utility maximisation and Material balance have to be satisfied, as 
well as the condition for the government’s budget to be balanced.  
Profit maximization implies that 
  0 0
i i
i y a y =-       iÎ C (1) 
 
i
i 0 0 p =a p       iÎ C (2) 









is identically equal to zero. 
Following Dixit (1975) we represent the condition for utility maximisation by  
  ( ), u = q x E q,       (3) 
                                                       
6 The term “leisure” is in fact misleading; a better term without misleading connotations is “the 
household’s consumption of labour”. 6 
 
  ( ) , , E u I £ q       (4) 
where  ( ) , E u q is  the  expenditure  function  corresponding  to  the  household’s  utility 
function.
7 The first of these two equations (3) says that  x must be the solution to the 
household’s problem of minimising the expenditures required to achieve the utility level 
u  at the prices q; the second equation (4) says that the household’s unearned income 
I must  be  larger  or  equal  to  these  expenditures.  By  the  zero  profit  condition  the 
household receives no unearned income, i.e.  0. I =  
 
Material balance for goods and labour, respectively, are 
                 ,
G
i i i y x x = +       i Î C (5) 





= + ∑       (6) 
The government’s budget constraint is 
' ( ) , u G = q t E q,       (7) 
By successive substitutions, equations (1) to (7) may be reduced to 




i a x E u
Î
+ ∑ q  +  ( ) 0 ,  E u q  + 0  
G x  = 0,  (8) 
0, ( , ) E u = q   (9) 
( ) ( ) 0 0 0 0 ( ) ( ) . i i i
i C
q p E u q a p E u G
Î
- + - = ∑ q, q,   (10) 
By Walras' law we can delete either (8) or (10). First deleting the government’s budget 
constraint (10), from the remaining general equilibrium conditions (8) and (9) it follows 
by the homogeneity of  ( ) E u q,  and  ( ) u q E q,  in  q of degree one and degree zero, 
respectively,  that  the  value  of  one  consumer  price  can  be  fixed  as  a  matter  of 
normalisation. As furthermore by the zero profit condition an equilibrium is unaffected 
by the choice of the producer price level, we can also as matter of normalisation assume 
one producer price as fixed.  In the optimal tax literature it is therefore often assumed 
that  “labour  is  untaxed”.  However,  to  avoid  misunderstandings  it  is  important  to 
distinguishing between the assumption that “the supply of labour to the market  0 x  is 
untaxed”,  which  an  arbitrary  rule  of  normalisation,  and  that  “the  household’s 
                                                       
7  ( ) , E u q is  the  value  function  corresponding  to  the  problem  ( ) { } min   '  s. t. u u =
x
q x x .  Using  the  subscript 
notation, we write net demand functions as  { } { } ( ) ( ), ( ),
i i u E u i FC x u i FC º Î Î =
q E q, q, q,  and the corresponding 













qq E q, q, q,   7 
 
consumption  of  labour  (leisure)  0 c cannot  be  taxed”,  which  is  a  behavioural 
assumption.
8  
Deleting the material balance condition (8), the general equilibrium conditions for a tax 
vector t to be feasible may be expressed as 
( ) 0, E u + = p t,    (11) 
' ( ) . u G + = q t E p t,   (12) 
Solving (11) for u  and then substituting in (12) the general equilibrium conditions may 
in fact be further reduced to just one equation 
' ( 0) , G + = t x p t,   (13) 
where  ( ) I + x p t, is the vector of ordinary demand functions. 
Adopting the Expenditure function approach imposing (11) and (12) as constraints on 
the government’s choice of tax instruments (rather than (13) as under the Indirect utility 
function approach)  the government’s maximisation problem may be formulated as
9  




( ) 0 E u + = p t,   
' ( ) . u G + = q t E p t,   (14) 
The corresponding Lagrangian expression is 
  ( ) i i
 i FC
£ ( + ) ( + , ) . u E u t E u G m l
Î
 
= + - + -  
  ∑ p t, p t   (15) 
The  first  order  conditions  with  respect  to  u  and  ( ) 0 1 N , ,.., q q q º q ,  for  an  optimal 
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8 On this point we differ from Dixit (1975) who is in error when assuming that also  0 c can be assumed 
untaxed as a matter of normalisation.  
9  Under  the  Indirect  utility  function  approach,  which  has  become  the  standard  in  the  optimal  tax 
literature, the government’s maximisation problem may alternatively be formulated as  ( )   ,0 Max V +
t
t p  
s. t.  ' ( 0) G + = t x p t, . However, the Expenditure function approach, adopted here, has compared with 
the Indirect utility function approach advantages both in terms of ease of derivation and in terms of 
interpretation of results. 8 
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Reordering  (17)  we  obtain  in  matrix  notation  the  conditions  to  be  satisfied  for  an 
optimal tax system,
10 






º >  because the Slutsky matrix  { } ( , ),  , ij E u i j FC º Î qq E q  is negative 
definite. In the Mirrlees tradition of optimal commodity taxation (see Mirrlees 1976), 
(19) is interpreted as the so-called Ramsey rule, that at the optimum the reduction in 
compensated demand for all commodities 
* * * ( , ) ( , ),  i i i x E u E u i FC D = - Î q p
 relative to 
the  first  best  solution 
* x   is  approximately  proportional.  Applying  this  rule  to 


















≃    (20) 
The optimal tax conditions (19) may therefore also be interpreted as saying that the 
basic distortion caused by the government being obliged to raise revenue by taxes based 
on market transaction rather than lump-sum taxation is that the supply of labour to the 
market is discouraged. 
 
As pointed out by Boadway (1997), the Ramsey rule does not provide much insight into 
what constitutes desirable directions of tax reform, or what characterises the optimal tax 
system.  However,  for  an  economy  with  only  two  produced  commodities,  i.e. 
( ) 0,1,2 FC = ,  an  explicit  optimal  tax  formula  has  been  derived  and  interpreted  in 
support of the Corlett and Hague conjecture that the commodity most complementary 
with leisure should be taxed at the highest rate
11. Assuming labour untaxed as a matter 
of normalisation, i.e.  0 0 t = , solving (19) for the optimal tax rates, it is possible to 
obtain (see e.g. Atkinson and Stiglitz 1980, pp375-376)  
                                                       
10  As  is  well  known,  this  result  can  also  be  achieved  using  the  Indirect  utility  functions  approach, 
however with less ease of derivation and of interpretation of Lagrangian multipliers. 
11 Many theoreticians emphasising the importance of analysing optimal tax problems within a general 
equilibrium framework have focused on characterising the optimum with reference to quantities rather 
than prices with the argument that optimal tax rules depend on arbitrary rules of normalisation. Realising 
however that ranking of tax rates are independent of rules of normalisation, it does make sense to derive 
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e º , i,kÎFC are compensated demand elasticities.  
To gain further insight we express this tax formula in terms of Allen-Uzawa elasticities 
of substitution, defined based on the full income expenditure function  ( ) , M u q
12
 as  
 
( ) ( )







M u M u




  , i j FC Î  (22) 
On this basis complementarity may be defined as (see Stern 2004): 
Definition 1: Two commodities i and j are complements (substitutes) for a given level of 
utility if an increase in the price of the j
th commodity increases (decreases) the quantity 
consumed of the i
th commodity (keeping the prices of all other commodities constant), 
i.e. if  the Allen-Uzawa elasticity of substitution ( ) 0 0 ( ). ij i j s ³ < ¹  
Since  ( ) ( ) , , ij ij M u E u = q q  
  , ij j ij a e s =   , i C j FC Î Î (23) 
where  j j j a q c R º  is the share of consumption of commodity j in the household’s full 
income  0 0 R pw = . 










  (24) 
and thus that 
  ( ) ( ) 11 22 12 21 10 20 . e e e e e e + = - + - +   (25) 
 
Substituting in (21) by (23) and (25), and since  ij ji s s = , we have 
  ( )
( )
1
1 2 12 0 20 1




a a a q







  (26) 
                                                       
12  ( ) , M u q is  the  value  function  corresponding  to  the  problem  ( ) { } min   '  s. t. u u = -
c
q c ω c .  Using  the 
subscript  notation,  we  write  gross  demand  functions  as  { } { } ( ) ( ), ( ),
i i M u M u i FC c u i FC º Î Î =
q q, q, q,  
and  the  corresponding  partial  demand  derivatives  as 













qq q, q, q,   10 
 
The interpretation of this tax formula may be expressed as: 
Proposition 1: In an economy with two produced commodities and one primary factor, 
labour, the optimal tax system will be characterised by  
a)  that commodity, which is most complementary with leisure in terms of the Allen-
Uzawa elasticity of substitution,  always being  taxed at the highest rate, i.e. if at 







b)   for a given value  of the elasticity of  substitution between the two  produced 
commodities,  12 s , the difference in tax rates is the greater,  the  greater the 
numerical value of  20 10 / s s  ; 
c)  for a given values of  20 10 / s s  the difference is also the greater, the smaller is 
12 s . 
In the next section we provide a more intuitive interpretation of this tax formula. 
 
4. Intuitive insight into what determines the optimal tax system 
The  defining  assumption  of  optimal  tax  theory  is  that  the  government  must  base 
taxation  on  market  transactions  as  neither  the  household’s  endowment  nor  the 
household’s consumption as such can be observed by the government. In this section 
we provide an intuitive, non-technical explanation of why a proportional tax system 
under this assumption must discourage the supply of labour and that the optimal tax 
system  therefore  represents  a  trade-off  for  the  government  between  two  basic 
objectives: to encourage the supply of labour to the market, and to limit the distortion of 
marginal rate of substitution between produced goods. 
By similar arguments as in the discussion above of  rules of normalisation, it follows 
from the general equilibrium conditions (8) and (9) that the imposition of a proportional 
tax system  j j T q p = ,  j FC Î   based on market transaction  , i x i FC Î  will leave the 
material  balance  conditions  and  the  household’s  budget  constraint  unchanged,  and 
therefore  will  generate  no  tax  revenue.  Any  feasible  tax  system  based  on  market 
transactions  will  therefore  be  distortionary  in  the  sense  that  the  marginal  rate  of 
substitution must differ from the marginal rate of transformation in production. 
If  counterfactually  commodity  taxation  based  on  consumption  of  all  commodities 
including leisure were possible, then a feasible tax system would have to satisfy the 
following conditions (compare with (8) and (9)) 11 
 




i a x M u
Î
+ + ∑ p t - ( ) 0 0 ,  M u w + + p t  + 0  
G x  = 0,      (27) 
0 0, ( , ) p M u w + = p t                 (28) 
where  ( ) , M u q
  is  the  full  income  expenditure  function.  By  the  homogeneity  of 
( ) M u q,  and  ( ) u q M q,  in q of degree one and degree zero, respectively, a tax system 
( )
* * * * *










, based on the consumption of all 
goods,  , i c i FC Î  is  equivalent to a tax on the household’s full income  0 0 R pw =  at rate 
* G
R
t = , and therefore a first-best solution.  
Now,  consider  a  tax  reform  replacing  the  first-best  tax  system 
* t   with  a  feasible 
proportional  tax  system  based  on  the  consumption  of  all  produced  commodities 
( ) 1 2 0, , ,..., N Tp Tp Tp = t . Such a tax reform clearly would increase the consumption of 
leisure  0 c  by decreasing the price of leisure relative to the prices of other commodities. 
However, as  , i i c x i C = Î , such a tax system can also be interpreted as a proportional 
tax system based on market transactions  , i x i FC Î . As  0 t may be fixed as a matter of 
normalisation without loss of generality, we therefore have: 
Proposition 2: A feasible proportional tax system  ( ) 0 1 2 , , ,..., N t Tp Tp Tp = t  based on 
market  transactions  , i x i FC Î   will  discourage  the  supply  of  labour  to  the  market 
compared with the first best allocation. 
The  basic  distortion  caused  by  the  government  raising  tax  revenue  by  commodity 
taxation based on market transaction rather than by lump-sum taxation may therefore be 
seen as the discouragement of the supply of labour to the market
13. 
Proposition 2 suggests that a tax reform involving replacing a proportional tax system 
by a non-proportional tax system where the tax rates on those goods which are highly 
complementary with leisure have been increased, and the tax rates for those, which are 
less so, have been decreased, will alleviate this basic distortion by increasing the supply 
of labour to the market, and hence increase welfare. However, differentiating tax rates 
obviously  cannot  increase  welfare  indefinitely  as  it  creates  another  distortion:  the 
marginal rates of substitution in consumption between produced commodities become 
more and more at variance with the marginal rates of transformation in production. In 
other words, as the distortion of the supply of labour is decreased, the distortion of the 
relative consumer prices of produced commodities is increased. The optimal tax system 
is achieved where the marginal gain in terms of encouragement of the supply of labour 
                                                       
13 As indeed follows from our interpretation of the Ramsey rule (see Equation (20)). 12 
 
corresponds to the marginal loss in terms of distorting the marginal rates of substitution 
in consumption. We therefore have: 
Proposition 3: The optimal tax system represent a compromise between two objectives: 
Objective 1: to encourage the supply of labour to the market, 
0 x - , 
and 
Objective 2: to limit the distortion the marginal rate of substitution in 







Taking  20 10 / s s as an indicator of Objective 1 and  12 s  as in indicator of Objective 2
14 
we see that Proposition 1 may be seen as a formal proof of Proposition 3 in the case of 
an economy with only two produced goods. However, this leaves open the question if it 
is possible to provide a formal proof of Proposition 3 also in the case of more than two 
produced goods. We return to this question in the Section 5. 
 
To provide a quantitative illustration of Proposition 3, we consider an economy with 
one primary factor, Labour, and two produced goods, Good 1 which is complementary 
with leisure and Good 2 which is less so. The household’s endowment of the primary 
factor is  0 390 w =  and the government’s requirement of Labour is  0 50
G x = . By choice 
of  units  all  producer  prices  are  equal  to  unity,  i.e.  ( ) ( ) 0 1 2 , , 1,1,1 p p p = .  When  the 
government resource requirement is financed by a lump-sum tax, the equilibrium net 
trade vector of the household is  ( ) ( ) 0 1 2 , , 150,50,50
FB x x x = = - x  and the household’s 
consumption  of  Labour  (leisure)  is  therefore  0 240 c = .  We  represent  household 
preferences  by  a  CES-UT
15  utility  function 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
0 1 0 2 0 1 2
0 1 2 0 1 0 1 1 2 0 2 2 , , , , ; , , ; ; u x x x u c C C c x C c x s s s s =   where 
0 1 2
0 0 0 0 0 c c c x w + + = + , 
and where  ( )
0 2
0, ; u c C s ,  ( )
1
1 2 , ; C C C s and  ( )
0
0, ; , (1,2)
i
i i i C c x i s Î  are CES functions. 
                                                       
14 The larger is 
20 10 / s s  
, the larger will be the increase in the supply of labour by a given increase in the 
differentiation of tax rates. The larger is 
12 s  
, the larger will be the increase in the distortion of the  
consumption  of produced commodities by a given increase in the differentiation of tax rates. 
15 For further details about the CES-UT (Constant Elasticity of Substitution with explicit representation of 
the Use of Time), see e.g. Munk (1998),"Optimal support to low income households”, EPRU Working 
Paper 1998-20, University of Copenhagen. The important property of the CES-UT utility function in the 
context of Proposition 3 is that it, in contrast to utility functions in general used in quantitative general 
equilibrium models, does not impose separability between the consumption of produced commodity and 
leisure. With an additive separable utility functions, as for example a nested CES function, there is no 
trade-off between Objective  1 and Objective 2, and the optimal tax system is therefore  proportional 
whatever the choice of parameter values. 13 
 
The  parameter  values  are 
0 0 1 2
1 2 0.1,  0.1,  1 and  0.5 s s s s = = = = .  The  consolidated 
matrix  of  substitution  elasticities  in  the  first  best  situation  corresponding  to  these 
parameter values is indicated in Table 1.
16 
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The  equilibrium  solution  when  the  government’s  requirement  is  financed  by  a 
proportional commodity tax system is 
P x . The second- best optimal solution is 
SB x . As 
a matter of normalisation, we assume the supply of labour to the market as untaxed. For 
the benchmark data set and the parameter values indicated above, 
P x and 
SB x  has been 
calculated by a small general equilibrium computer program. The results are provided 
in Table 2. 
 
Table 2: Market transactions under different tax systems  









1 x  50  49  47 
2 x   50  40  46 
0 x -   150  139  143 
1 q  
1  1.56  1.77 
1 q  





= -  
1  1  1.31 
 
                                                       
16 Notice that as 
20 10   s s > , Commodity 1 is more complementary with leisure than Commodity 2.  14 
 
Figure 1: The First-Best (FB), Second-Best (SB) allocation and the allocation with a proportional 
tax system (PS). 
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In Figure 1 the three equilibrium solutions are projected into the  1 2 x x - space. The 
results indicate, first, that the supply of labour to the market is larger under an optimally 
differentiated than under a proportional commodity tax system, but smaller in the case 
of the first best  solution, i.e.  0 0 0
FB SB P x x x - > - > - , and, second, that  the  second best 
solution  represents  a  compromise  between  the  two  objectives  as  expressed  in 
Proposition 3. If the difference in elasticities of substitution between consumption and 
leisure  for  the  two  produced  goods  20 10 / s s   had  been  larger,  or  the  elasticity  of 
substitution between the two produced commodities  12 s  had been smaller, then 
SB x  
would have involved a larger distortion of the rate of substitution and a larger supply of 
labour. 
 
5. The  optimal  tax  system  in  the  case  of  many  produced 
commodities 
The fact that (26) cannot be generalised to an economy with more than two produced 
commodities suggests that the Allen-Uzawa elasticity of substitution does not provide 
the  appropriate  measure  of  complementarity  for  quantitative  representation  of 
Proposition  3,  i.e.  for  understanding  what  determines  the  optimal  tax  system.  We 
therefore consider an alternative measure of complementarity, the Antonelli elasticity. 
Using this measure we derive a tax formula similar to (26), but valid for an economy 
with many produced commodities. 
By the homogeneity of degree 1 of  ( ) , M u q  we have 
  ( ) ( ) , , , M u RM u = q q ɶ   (29) 
where  R is the household’s full income and q ɶ is the vector of normalised commodity 
prices whose elements are  ,  , i i q q R i j FC = Î ɶ . Therefore 
1 . R = qq qq M M ɶ   (30) 
 
The distance function may be defined as
 17. 
  ( ) ( ) { } , min  s.t.  , 1 , D u M u º ³ q c qc q ɶ ɶ ɶ   (31) 
and  the  Antonelli  elasticity  of  complementarity  may  be  defined  from  the  distance 
function (see Deaton 1979 and Stern 2004) as
  
  ( ) ( )







D u D u




      , i j FC Î (32) 
Using this concept, complementarity may be defined as (see Stern 2004): 
                                                       
17 The Distance function indicates the amount by which the consumption vector must be deflated or 
inflated to reach the indifference curve associated with u. The Distance function is increasing, linear 
homogenous, and concave with respect to c, and decreasing in u.  16 
 
Definition 2: Two commodities i and j are complements (substitutes) for a given level 
of utility, if an increase in the consumption of the j
th commodity increases (decreases) 
the  marginal  valuation  of  the  i
th  commodity  keeping  the  consumption  of  all  other 
commodities constant, i.e. if  ( ) 0 0 ( ). ij i j r ³ < ¹  
The Antonelli matrix  cc D  is the generalised inverse of the Slutsky matrix  qq M ɶ with the 
implication that 
  '. I = - cc qq D M qc ɶ ɶ   (33) 
Starting from the well-known condition for an optimal tax system (19), we now derive 
an  optimal  tax  formula  for  an  economy  with  many  produced  commodities.  Since 
= x c-ωwe have 
  ( ). q =- qq E t c-ω     (34) 
 
Pre-multiplying by  cc D , using that  = qq qq M E  and that  ( ) 1 R = qq qq M M ɶ , we have 
  ( ) ( ), R q =- cc qq cc D M t D c-ω ɶ     (35) 
and then by (33) we have 
  ( ) ( ) ( ) ' . I R q - =- cc qc t D c-ω ɶ     (36) 
 
Assuming as a matter of normalisation that labour is untaxed, we obtain by similar 
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We therefore have: 
Proposition  4:  In  an  economy  with  many  produced  commodities  and  one  primary 
factor, labour, the optimal tax system will be characterised by  
a)  the  commodity  which  is  most  complementary  with  leisure  in  terms  of  the 
Antonelli elasticities of complementarity being taxed at the highest rate, i.e. if at 






b)  for given values of  00 r , the difference in tax rates is the greater, the greater the 
numerical value of  0 0 / i j r r ; 17 
 
c)  for a given value of  0 0 / i j r r , the difference is also the greater, the smaller the 
numerical value of  00 r . 
The  size  of  0 j r   represents  the  curvature  of  the  indifference  curve 
( ) 0 1 2 , , ,.. ., j N u x x x x x u =  and is thus related to the effect of increasing the price of j on 
the labour supply; the size of  00 r  represents the curvature of the indifference surface 
( ) 0 1 2 , , ,..., N u x x x x u =  and is thus related to the distortionary cost of differentiating the 
tax rates for produced commodities. Taking  0 0 / i j r r as an indicator of the gain in terms 
of Objective 1, and  00 r  as an indicator of the loss in terms of Objective 2, Proposition 4 
may  be  interpreted  in  support  of    Proposition 3,  i.e.  that  the  optimal tax  system  is 
determined as a trade-off between Objective 1 and Objective 2, where at the optimum 
the gain in terms of encouraging the labour supply is balanced by the loss due to a 
further distortion of the marginal rate of substitution between produced commodities. 
Proposition 4 is valid for any number of produced commodities. The Antonelli elasticity 
of complementarity therefore constitutes the appropriate measure of complementarity 
for understanding what determines the optimal tax system. The Antonelli elasticity of 
complementarity  between  commodities  i  and  j  represents  the  curvature  of  the 
indifference curve where the consumption of all other commodities are kept constant, 
where the Allen-Uzawa elasticity of substitution assumes that the prices of all other 
commodities are kept constant. In the case of two produced commodities the question 
of keeping the amount of other produced commodities constant does not arise. This is 
the reason why in that case, Proposition 1 and 4 provide basically the same insight into 
what characterises the optimal tax system. 
 
6.  Discussion of implications for applied policy analysis  
In this section we consider the implications of the theoretical analysis for applied policy 
analysis. 
The received wisdom in the public economic literature is that the potential welfare gains 
by  differentiating  tax  rates  are  modest  (see  e.g.  Heady  1993).  Considering  that  the 
administrative costs are likely to be higher for a differentiated tax system than for a 
proportional tax system, it is indeed possible that the latter is the optimal solution to the 
government’s problem  of raising a given amount of  tax  revenue at minimum costs. 
However, when the complementarity between the consumption of purchased goods and 
leisure  differs  significantly  (as  for  example  between  household  services  and  leisure 
travel)  and  when  the  informal  sector  is  large  (as  in  many  developing  countries),  a 
differentiated tax system may be associated with a significant welfare gain justifying 
the additional administrative costs. 18 
 
We suggest that there are at least two reasons why the Corlett and Hague insight should 
be given more attention in the context of discussion of tax reform than is in general the 
case. First, the use of the term “leisure” in interpreting the Corlett and Hague insight is 
potentially misleading. It may give the false impression that it is the complementarity of 
the consumption of  goods  with the  household’s use of  time for  relaxation which  is 
important for the determination of the optimal tax system. In the context of the standard 
optimal tax model with one representative household and one primary factor, “leisure” 
in fact represents the use of labour not only for relaxation but for all consumption, 
production and exchange activities within the household sector (the informal sector) 
which the government cannot observe or can observe only at excessive administrative 
costs, and  on which  the  government therefore cannot base taxation.  In particular in 
developing countries where up to 80% of the labour resources are used in the informal 
sector stimulating the supply of labour for use in the formal sector by differentiating tax 
rates on household purchases of commodities produced in the formal sector may be 
associated with a considerable welfare gain. Second, during the last 50 years the share 
of  government  expenditures  in  national  income  has  increased  in  most  countries, 
increasing  the  distortionary  costs  of taxation, and  at the same  time the costs  of tax 
administration  have  decreased  due  to  innovations  in  information  technology.  Both 
developments  have  changed  the  trade-off  between  the  allocative  benefits  and  the 
administrative  costs  in  favour  of  more  complicated  commodity  tax  systems.  These 
insights seem important in relation to two areas which are currently prominent in the 
political debate: The use of domestic and border taxes to raise revenue in developing 
countries; and tax and price reform to combat global warming.  
In developing countries with large informal sectors and with relative large costs of tax 
administration,  the  question  has  be  raised  if  not  border  taxes  would  be  better  than 
domestic taxes to raise government revenue (see e.g. Emran and Stiglitz 2005, Gordon 
and Li 2005 and Munk 2008). 
In environmental economics, under the heading of the “Double dividend”, it has been 
discussed if differentiation of taxes to achieve environmental objectives in addition to 
the environmental benefits would generate benefits in terms of allocational efficiency. 
The received wisdom among public finance economists is that there is no or little scope 
for a green tax reform to be associated with a double dividend (see eg. Goulder 1995, 
Bovenberg and de Mooij 1994, Bovenberg 1999 and Sandmo 2000). Indeed the case for 
discounting the possibility for a green tax reform being associated with a substantial 
double divided may have been overstated by disregard of the administrative costs of 
taxation and the imposition of unrealistic separability assumptions. For example in road 
transport, a area where tax reform will be very important for combating both congestion 
and global warming, it has been suggested that the effect of higher taxes on transport in 
terms of stimulating the labour supply might be more significant than the benefits of 
reducing the external damage associated with transport (see Parry and Bonito 2001). 
In summary, arguments in support of proportional tax systems which were valid when 
optimal tax theory was first developed in the 1970s with reference to conditions in 19 
 
developed countries, may not any longer apply due to technological progress, and may 
never  have  been  valid  in  developing  countries  due  to  their  large  informal  sectors. 
Applied policy analysis need to accommodate this insight. 
 
7.  Summary and suggestions for future research 
In this paper we have provided an intuitive explanation of what determines the optimal 
tax system as a trade-off between two objectives: 1) to encourage the supply of labour 
to the market and 2) to limit the distortion of marginal rates of substitution between 
produced  commodities.  We  have  derived  a  many-goods  optimal  tax  formula  and 
interpreted this and the well known optimal tax formula in the case of two goods in 
support of this insight. In this context we have identified the Antonelli elasticity as the 
appropriate measure of complementarity for understanding what determines the optimal 
tax system. This has provided an intuitive rationale and a formal proof for the insight 
first provided by Corlett and Hague (1953) that the goods most complementary with the 
household’s use of labour (“leisure”) should be taxed at the highest rates, and also for 
the fact that the differentiation should be the greater the more difficult the substitution 
between  produced  commodities.  We  have  thus  discarded  the  idea  that  the  rule  of 
normalisation  adopted  has  any  importance  in  this  context.  With  respect  to  the 
implication  for  applied  policy  analysis,  we  have  drawn  attention  to  the  potential 
importance  in  the  context  of  tax  reform  analysis  to  use  models  with  explicit 
representation of the consumption of time (leisure) in the household sector, and to avoid 
unrealistic  separability  assumptions  with  respect  to  the  interaction  between 
consumption and leisure. 
On this background we suggest the following areas for future research: 1) empirical and 
theoretical analysis on how household consumption and production activities influence 
the  preferences  expressed  by  utility  functions  defined  on  the  household’s  market 
transactions, and 2) empirical research on the costs of tax administration as a function 
of the design of the tax system, in particular in developing countries. The first suggests 
a need for further effort to combine theoretical insight from the theory of household 
production by Becker (1965) and Lancaster (1966) with optimal tax theory as pioneered 
by Atkinson and Stern (1979). The second suggests the need for combining the insight 
from the fast growing literature on the administrative costs of taxation (see e.g. Evan 
2003) with optimal tax theory. 
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Annex: Derivation of the optimal tax formula 
We have 
  ( ) ( ) ( ) ' , I R q - =- cc qc t D c-ω ɶ     (39) 
and thus that 
  ( ) ( ) ' . R q = - cc t qc t D c-ω ɶ     (40) 
Since  0 = cc D c  
  ( ) ' . R q = + cc t qc t D ω ɶ     (41) 
Substituting by the government’s budget constraint,( )' G - = c ω t , we get 
  ( ) ( ) ' . G R q = + + cc t q ω t D ω ɶ     (42) 
Multiplying by  ' ω  we have 
  ( ) ( ) ' ' ' ' . G R q = + + cc ω t ω q ω t ω D ω ɶ     (43) 
Assuming as a matter of normalisation that labour is untaxed, i.e.  0 0 t = , and thus that 
' 0 = ω t , we have 
  ( ) 0 ' ' . G R q = + cc ω q ω D ω ɶ   (44) 
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